Transparency you can trust: Transparency requirements for artificial intelligence between legal norms and contextual concerns by Felzmann, H. et al.
Article
Transparency you can trust:
Transparency requirements for
artificial intelligence between legal
norms and contextual concerns
Heike Felzmann1, Eduard Fosch Villaronga2, Christoph Lutz3
and Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux4
Abstract
Transparency is now a fundamental principle for data processing under the General Data Protection Regulation. We
explore what this requirement entails for artificial intelligence and automated decision-making systems. We address the
topic of transparency in artificial intelligence by integrating legal, social, and ethical aspects. We first investigate the ratio
legis of the transparency requirement in the General Data Protection Regulation and its ethical underpinnings, showing
its focus on the provision of information and explanation. We then discuss the pitfalls with respect to this requirement by
focusing on the significance of contextual and performative factors in the implementation of transparency. We show that
human–computer interaction and human-robot interaction literature do not provide clear results with respect to the
benefits of transparency for users of artificial intelligence technologies due to the impact of a wide range of contextual
factors, including performative aspects. We conclude by integrating the information- and explanation-based approach to
transparency with the critical contextual approach, proposing that transparency as required by the General Data
Protection Regulation in itself may be insufficient to achieve the positive goals associated with transparency. Instead,
we propose to understand transparency relationally, where information provision is conceptualized as communication
between technology providers and users, and where assessments of trustworthiness based on contextual factors medi-
ate the value of transparency communications. This relational concept of transparency points to future research direc-
tions for the study of transparency in artificial intelligence systems and should be taken into account in policymaking.
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Introduction
Increasing attention is given to artificial intelligence
(AI). While the term AI is difficult to define,1 the core
concerns linked to AI are connected to automated deci-
sion-making processes: decisions that are delegated to a
machine or system (AlgorithmWatch, 2019). With the
rise of automated decision-making systems (Amoore,
2018), transparency2 has become a key topic (Burrell,
2016; Pasquale, 2015). While traditional algorithms
might already have challenged the notion of transpar-
ency, particularly among non-experts, AI systems rely-
ing on deep learning allow processes to run largely
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independently of human control (Alpaydin, 2016; Zerilli
et al., 2018). As it becomes unforeseeable how such pro-
cesses reach decisions, the intuitive wish for prospective
and retrospective transparency arises. Prospective trans-
parency informs users about the data processing and the
working of the system upfront. It describes how the AI
system reaches decisions in general. Thus, prospective
transparency can be seen as an accountability mechan-
ism (Zerilli et al., 2018). Retrospective transparency, on
the other hand, refers to post hoc explanations and
rationales (Paal and Pauly, 2018). It reveals for a specific
case how and why a certain decision was reached,
describing the data processing step by step.
Retrospective transparency includes the notion of
inspectability and explainability. Thus, for an algorith-
mic decision-making system to have retrospective trans-
parency, one should be able to inspect its ‘‘internals,’’
decompose a decision to understand the structure and
weighing system within the system, and ultimately
explain a decision. Thus, retrospective transparency is
important for audit purposes.
The goal of the article is to scrutinize the topic of
transparency in AI systems from an integrated interdis-
ciplinary perspective. While we acknowledge the grow-
ing research interest in this field and the many
contributions made in recent years (Miller, 2019), our
contribution provides value by synthesizing and inte-
grating the literature across research areas, including
legal, ethical, and social science perspectives. More con-
cretely, we integrate the findings of data protection law,
law and technology, robot ethics, information ethics,
social media research, and human–computer interaction
(HCI). By doing so, we can show tensions but also
potential synergies in how transparency is approached
across disciplines. This gives us the opportunity to bring
different communities in conversation to each other.
Our paper is organized in a way that loosely follows
a dialectical approach,3 with a thesis that presents an
explanation- and information-based view on transpar-
ency in AI, as implemented in the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). The anti-thesis takes
a critical approach towards the explanation- and infor-
mation-based view of transparency. Finally, we attempt
to align the information-based view with some of the
critiques it has received in a synthesis that calls for a
relational approach to the study of transparency in AI.
The article is structured into four sections.
Following the introductory remarks, in the next section
(‘‘Transparency in data protection law’’) we explore
how transparency is understood in data protection
law. We show how certain ethical considerations,
based on autonomy and informed consent, are implicit
in data protection law. Given the current debate about
the right to reasonable inferences in the context of the
GDPR (Wachter and Mittelstadt, 2019), the legal
analysis focuses strongly on the European context.
This section, which describes the framework for trans-
parency in AI, at least in most parts of Europe, is then
contrasted with the messy reality of transparency in
practice. The following section (‘‘The limits of transpar-
ency for AI’’) then explores the variety of contextual
factors that transparency measures for AI need to take
into account. Based on a review of research in HCI, it
addresses considerations regarding the wider social
embeddedness of transparency, highlighting the limita-
tions of transparency-as-information or -explanation in
an increasingly datafied world. We continue in section
‘‘Transparency as a relational concept’’ by integrating
the information- and explanation-based view of trans-
parency with the critical context-sensitive view, by
means of understanding transparency relationally. We
propose to understand transparent information provi-
sion as an act of communication between technology
providers and users, where assessments of trustworthi-
ness based on contextual factors mediate the value of
transparency communications to the user. A short sec-
tion with recommendations for future research on
transparency in AI and for policy concludes the article.
Transparency in data protection law
Transparency in European data protection law
The origins of the transparency requirement in
data protection law date to the 31st International
Conference of Data Protection and Privacy
Commissioners held in Madrid in November 2009, in
which the importance of transparency to protect an
individuals’ privacy was acknowledged. After being
included in the proposal for the GDPR in 2012, the
transparency principle made its way into the binding
GDPR. Today, transparency is a core principle
enshrined in Art. 5(1)(a) of the GDPR which states
that personal data must be ‘‘processed lawfully, fairly
and in a transparent manner in relation to the data
subject,’’ thereby illustrating the close connection
between transparency, lawfulness, and fairness. Art.
5(1)(a) of the GDPR, as the first of the core principles
of data processing, is a ‘‘catch-all’’ provision, which is
going to be typically called upon as a means of last
resort if more concrete principles are not applicable in
a specific scenario. Failing to adhere to it can be pun-
ished with steep fines (cf. Art. 84 of the GDPR).
Prospective and retrospective elements
of transparency
Transparency, as understood under Art. 5(1)(a) of the
GDPR, includes both, a prospective and retrospective
element (Paal and Pauly, 2018). First, prospective
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transparency means that individuals must be informed
about the ongoing data processing before such process-
ing takes place and is therefore linked to the informa-
tion duties of the GDPR. According to data protection
law, prospective transparency requires from data con-
trollers (i.e. the organization processing personal data)
to inform data subjects (i.e. the individuals to whom the
personal data belong to) in concise, easily accessible,
easy-to-understand and clear and plain language
(and where appropriate with visualization; see Rec. 39
and 58). Such information must be provided in writing
or, where appropriate, by electronic means, and the
information must come in an intelligible and easily
accessible form (in particular when data controllers
target children; see Art. 12 of the GDPR). The new
legislation requires data controllers to provide informa-
tion about themselves (who), the quantity and quality
of processed data (how), the time(-frame) of the
processing activities (when), the reason (why), and the
purpose of processing (what for) (Paal et al., 2018;
Plath, 2017).
Second, data protection law includes a retrospective
transparency element which refers to the possibility to
trace back how and why a particular decision was
reached. Recital 71 of the GDPR highlights that the
data subject has ‘‘the right to obtain human interven-
tion, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an
explanation of the decision reached after such assess-
ment and to challenge the decision.’’ This element has
led to lively discussions especially among legal scholars
about whether a ‘‘right to explanation’’ exists in the
GDPR or not (Casey et al., 2019; Edwards and
Veale, 2017, 2018; Goodman and Flaxman, 2017;
Kaminski, 2019; Selbst and Powels, 2017; Wachter
et al., 2017). These discussions build upon literature
and proposals for building ‘‘explainable AI,’’ although
more interdisciplinary research between legal scholars
and AI developers is needed (Felzmann et al., 2019;
Miller, 2019; Santiago and Escrig, 2017).
From a legal perspective, one question has been if a
right to explanation can be inferred from the wording
of Arts. 13(2)(f) and 15(1)(h) of the GDPR. These art-
icles state that meaningful information about the logic
involved as well as the significance and the envisaged
consequences of such processing must be provided to
the data subjects at least when such decisions produce
legal effects on them or significantly affect them (cf. also
Rec. 71 and Art. 22 of the GDPR). The wording
‘‘meaningful information about the logic involved’’
and ‘‘significance of the consequences’’ and ‘‘envisaged
consequences’’ are, if any, very similar to the concept of
an ‘‘explanation,’’ which the data subject has access to
via article 15 of the GDPR (Pagallo, 2018; Selbst and
Powels, 2017). Yet, it remains unclear what level of
detail a ‘‘meaningful’’ explanation has to achieve.
It is obvious that an explanation which specifies meticu-
lously the technical processes of automated decision-
making processes is unlikely to achieve the aims tied
to the transparency requirement (Kuner et al., 2017).
An explanation should therefore be evaluated from the
perspective of the individual demanding it. Overall, an
explanation ‘‘should permit an observer to determine
the extent to which a particular input was determinative
or influential on the output’’ (Doshi-Velez et al.,
2017: 3). Following this definition, the information pro-
vided to users should either enable them to determine
the main factors in a decision or understand how cer-
tain factors alter a decision (Doshi-Velez et al., 2017; cf.
also Wachter et al., 2017; Zerilli et al., 2018).
Reasonable inferences
A right to explanation might provide an effective ex-
post solution for retrospective transparency because it
occurs after a system reaches a decision. However, such
an explanation does not per se justify the reason why
such a decision has been taken nor does it protect the
user from suffering the consequences linked to that
decision. Wachter and Mittelstadt (2019) argue that
the current legal framework does not accurately protect
data subjects from high-risk inferential analytics
(i.e. privacy-invasive or reputation-damaging inferences
with low verifiability, such as predictive or opinion-
based inferences). Therefore, they propose to consider
the ‘‘right to a reasonable inference,’’ which follows the
idea of prospective transparency; that, before a decision
is made, the data subject should have the right to
require from the data controller a justification of
whether an inference is reasonable. Such a right
would demand the disclosure of why certain data is
needed to draw an inference, why these inferences are
necessary to achieve a specific processing purpose or
decision, and ‘‘whether the data and methods used to
draw the inferences are accurate and statistically reli-
able’’ (Wachter and Mittelstadt, 2019: 5). The right to a
reasonable inference and a right to an explanation
taken together would provide for overall (ex-ante and
ex-post) transparency, which in turn can be seen as in
line with the aim of Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR.
Ethical underpinnings of the information- and
explanation-based approach to transparency
The importance given to the information requirement,
associated with transparency in the GDPR, reflects
underlying assumptions about the value of informed
consent for technology users. Informed consent is
underpinned by an understanding of the technology
user as an autonomous individual who makes their
decisions independently on the basis of weighing
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information in light of their convictions and values.
Autonomy is a foundational concept in ethics, with a
rich history (Schneewind, 1998) and varied meanings
(Christman, 1988, 2014; Dworkin, 1988), closely
linked to a specific view of the nature of the self as
independent, self-contained and internally driven, an
‘‘inner citadel’’ (Christman, 1988). This conception
has strong roots in the enlightenment, but its adequacy
has been fundamentally questioned for example in
postmodern, feminist, and social constructionist
thought (e.g. Benhabib, 1992; Foucault, 1979; Taylor,
1989). These positions argue that the self cannot be
adequately understood without giving regard to the
fundamental impact of historical, relational, and soci-
etal aspects (e.g. Marwick and Boyd, 2014).
While such critiques of the enlightenment concept of
the self fundamentally question the assumption of
autonomy as genuinely independent individual choice,
even within a perspective that endorses the autonomous
self, achieving a truly autonomy-respecting informed
consent would require going beyond the minimalistic
requirement of notice and consent that currently char-
acterizes consent in the context of contemporary infor-
mation technologies. Within data protection law, notice
and consent refers to providing information about the
envisaged data processing to an individual before
the actual data processing takes place (cf. Art. 13 of
the GDPR). The individual then has the option to con-
sent to data processing on the basis of this information
but must do so freely and state their choice unambigu-
ously (cf. Art. 4(11) of the GDPR). In practice, notice
and consent is generally realized through the provision,
by the service provider, of statements containing relevant
information, such as privacy policies, and the ticking of
a box for consent by the service user. The limitations of
this use of notice and consent have been widely discussed
(Ben-Shahar and Schneider, 2014; Solove, 2013).
In keeping with established criteria of informed con-
sent in ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 2012; Faden
and Beauchamp, 1986), facilitating genuine informed
consent would go beyond the mere provision of infor-
mation, followed by the expression of a choice. Instead,
it would require the service provider to adapt such
information to user characteristics and needs, to
avoid carefully implicitly coercive consent contexts,
and to elucidate in a user-friendly, specific, and con-
crete way what the system was doing. In addition, it
also requires to take care to support users in achieving
understanding and facilitating users’ informed reflec-
tion process, and allowing them to make decisions
that reflect their wishes and values. These conditions
are quite demanding even in contexts where consent is
obtained through personal engagement with trained
professionals and may not be met in the more restrict-
ive impersonal settings of notice and consent, even if
information on AI is provided transparently in line
with legal requirements of the GDPR.
Provision of transparency also encounters further
challenges due to the nature of the technologies. For
the increasingly popular speech-based AI devices with-
out primary visual interfaces, such as Alexa, even the
limited requirements of the notice and consent para-
digm are difficult to meet, insofar as the modality of
interaction provides challenges regarding how to pre-
sent relevant information to users (Hoofnagle, 2018).
Even more generally, obscurity is a very common,
and in some respect unavoidable characteristic of AI
explanations (Brauneis and Goodman, 2018; Burrell,
2016). However, beyond these concerns that impact dir-
ectly on the general question of information provision
in transparency, there are significant further challenges
to the practical realization of transparency which will
be discussed in the following section.
The limits of transparency for AI
Transparency, stakeholders, and the
implementation context
Intended as a technology-neutral piece of legislation,
the GDPR’s strength lies in providing general legal
requirements across technologies. However, not recog-
nizing specific technologies and associated contexts
neglects crucial elements for protecting users’ data-
related rights. Transparency for AI systems raises par-
ticular challenges beyond the question of how to ensure
that information is provided to the user and what infor-
mation needs to be presented to users.
One challenge is the complexity of stakeholders and
the different expectations they have over the same
concept. This point is captured, for instance, in
Weller’s (2017) investigation on the roles and types
of transparency in the context of human intelligibility
of AI (Table 1).
The table suggests that the transparency requirement
should be tailored to the stakeholder more broadly,
including developers, users, regulators, deployers, and
society in general. The work from Weller (2017), how-
ever, does not include different types of users within
each stakeholder group such as secondary or disabled
users. For example, with AI systems like Amazon Echo
(Crawford and Joler, 2018), bystanders can inadvert-
ently be included in the operation of the AI (Shaban,
2018) who may often have inaccurate, contextually
influenced expectations on how information flows
within those systems (Nissenbaum, 2011). In such
cases, how can informed use on the basis of transpar-
ency be ensured for all users?
Making information open and transparent requires
the individuals affected to be literate in assessing the
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risks of AI and automated decision-making systems
and puts the onus on them to challenge automated deci-
sions (Edwards and Veale, 2018). For users of AI-based
assistive technologies with disabilities or special sup-
port needs, the technology is frequently employed in
settings where multiple actors across professional and
social roles, and with varied knowledge and capacity
levels, interact (Kuner at al., 2017). Accordingly, such
technologies require that a multiplicity of defined users
need to be taken into account by the transparency spe-
cifications. Stakeholder groups differ in their ability to
make use of information provided, and different types
of information pose different barriers to understanding
(as identified with regard to clinical populations by
Tam et al., 2015; Redelmaier et al., 1993). Even more
generally, research on disclosure and informed consent
across practice domains has consistently shown that
there are significant challenges to the effective use of
information provided even for cognitively and clinically
unimpaired individuals (Ben-Shahar and Schneider,
2014; Grady, 2015; Solove, 2013), limiting significantly
the likely practical benefit of transparency. Therefore,
attention to the specificity of the technology, the con-
text, and the different types of users within each stake-
holder group is essential for protecting users’ data
protection-related rights.
The multiplicity of transparency effects:
Lessons from HCI
While a rich body of literature explores transparency in
AI systems and its outcomes in computer science, HCI,
and HRI (cf. Table 2, see also Biran and Cotton, 2017),
so far little research on the transparency expectations
or demands of users exists (Berkelaar, 2014), particu-
larly not when it comes to the GDPR.4 In other words,
the study of transparency in the sense of explainability
and explainable AI (XAI) has been a vivid stream of
research in the AI community since the 1990s but it has
drawn little from human–human interaction and the
social sciences (Miller, 2019). Although there are no
firmly established core findings on transparency yet,
HCI and HRI research shows that users’ perception
of and attitudes to transparency differ substantially
depending on the technologies and services investi-
gated, tasks given, and the context of use.
In the context of recommender systems, for example,
transparency of music recommendations increased par-
ticipants’ satisfaction with the recommendation and
their confidence (Sinha and Swearingen, 2002). By con-
trast, Cramer et al. (2008) looked at recommender sys-
tems in the cultural heritage domain but did not find a
positive effect of transparency on trust in the system.
However, they could show that transparency increased
the acceptance of the recommendations. This is in line
with earlier findings from Herlocker et al. (2000). Kim
and Hinds (2006) investigated the influence of robot
transparency on credit and blame attributions but
found no significant effect on the attribution of blame
and credit to the robot and the participants.
Following up on these earlier studies, recent research
has studied transparency and explanations in algo-
rithms, particularly on social media. Rader et al.
(2018), for example, studied the Facebook newsfeed
algorithm to examine the effects of what-explanations,
how-explanations, why-explanations, and objective-
explanations on different outcomes. They found that
transparency strengthened awareness and accountabil-
ity but had a limited effect on the perceived correctness
and interpretability of the algorithm. What- and how-
explanations worked better than why- and objective-
explanations. Interestingly, more than half of the
Table 1. Transparency understanding by stakeholder (adapted from Weller, 2017).
Transparency in the context of robotics and AI
For a... To...
Developer Understand whether their system is working properly in order to identify and remove errors from the
system or improve it
User Provide a sense for what the system is doing and why, to enable intelligibility of future unpredicted actions
circumstances and build a sense of trust in the technology
Understand why one particular decision was reached
Allow a check that the system worked appropriately
Enable meaningful challenge (e.g. credit approval or criminal sentencing)
Society broadly Understand and become comfortable with the strengths and limitations of the system
Overcome a reasonable fear of the unknown
Expert/Regulator Provide the ability to audit a prediction or decision trail in detail, particularly (un)intended harmful actions,
e.g. a crash by an autonomous car
Deployer Make a user feel comfortable with a prediction or decision, so that they keep using the system
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 Big Data & Society
participants did not know that an algorithm curates
their Facebook newsfeed. This is in line with Eslami
et al. (2015), where 63% of the participants were not
aware that a newsfeed algorithm exists on Facebook. In
this study, the authors constructed a newsfeed visual-
ization tool, contrasting an unfiltered and filtered ver-
sion of the algorithm. Transparency about the existence
of the algorithm did not only result in positive reactions
but also in ambivalent emotions such as surprise and
curiosity, and sometimes even in negative emotions
such as dissatisfaction. Overall, however, with
increased duration of the study, the participants
became more satisfied with the way Facebook curates
content through its newsfeed algorithm.
In online advertising, transparency refers to explan-
ations why specific personalized ads are shown to a
person. Eslami et al. (2018) found that transparency
needs to have the right level of specificity to enhance
trust and satisfaction. Explanations that are too vague
or too specific create feelings of unease and distrust.
More algorithmic transparency can lead to algorithmic
disillusionment, where algorithms appear less powerful
and useful but more fallible and inaccurate than previ-
ously thought (see also Kizilcec, 2016). In that sense,
enhanced transparency might not always be a blessing
but sometimes a burden (Lim and Dey, 2009).
Table 2 presents an overview of HCI and HRI trans-
parency research. These results are mixed, lacking a
definite conclusion regarding transparency implica-
tions. While the requirement of transparency has
strong ethical and rights-based support, the results
from HCI and HRI research indicate that, from a prag-
matic and user-centered perspective, there is no clear
use case for making intelligent systems more transpar-
ent. From an industry point of view, this is the same
case (Eiband et al., 2018). Investments in transparency
by AI developers could be costly, while the effects and
benefits are unclear and there is a risk that transparency
might backfire, either because it may prioritize seeing
over understanding, create false binaries, or because it
results in harm (Ananny and Crawford, 2018; see also
the following section). Traditional autonomy- and
rights-driven demands for transparency need to con-
tend with this.
From Table 2, it also becomes clear that most HCI
and HRI studies investigating transparency outcomes
were conducted in the US, which might affect their
transferability to a European context. For example, it
could be that making assistive robotics more transpar-
ent would lead to positive outcomes in European coun-
tries with a strong trust and transparency culture (e.g.
in Northern Europe), but might not have as much of an
effect or be even detrimental in societies with less insti-
tutional trust and transparency. Furthermore, as
Ausloos et al. (2018) note, such research has been
mostly unconnected to legal considerations. As dis-
cussed, the GDPR comes with new transparency
requirements that might clash with established trans-
parency practices and lead to unintended consequences.
These concerns are underexplored in HCI and HRI,
and the lack of clarity about the implementation of
the GDPR transparency requirements calls for more
interdisciplinary collaboration between HCI research-
ers and legal scholars (Ausloos et al., 2018).
The performance of transparency: Organizational
and societal aspects
The implications of transparency should be considered
not just with regard to human interaction with specific
technologies and their contexts of use, but also from a
broader theoretical and normative perspective (Miller,
2019) that considers how transparency practices are
embedded into wider organizational and cultural con-
texts. As work in critical algorithm studies has pointed
out, transparency practices do not take place in a social
vacuum but play particular roles in their specific cul-
tural and organizational settings (Beer, 2017; Kemper
and Kolkman, 2018). It has been argued that algo-
rithms should not merely be seen as ‘‘objects to be
known through observations’’ (Ziewitz, 2017: 3) but
as ‘‘only [to] be evaluated in their functioning as com-
ponents of extended computational assemblages’’
(Lowrie, 2017: 1). In that sense, algorithms are intim-
ately linked to practices of sense-making, highlighting
the trickiness of the ‘‘nuts and bolts of how to work
with them’’ (Thomas et al., 2018: 2). As Seaver (2017: 1)
argues, algorithms can be understood ‘‘as culture,’’
as ‘‘heterogenous and diffuse sociotechnical systems,
rather than rigidly constrained and procedural
formulas.’’
Albu and Flyverbom (2019) in summarizing the lit-
erature on organizational transparency differentiated
two broad approaches: transparency as verifiability
and transparency as performativity. The first approach
understands transparency as the disclosure of informa-
tion. Transparency as outlined in Section 2, with regard
to its understanding in the GDPR and in the tradition
of informed consent, aligns with this approach.
Following this understanding, organizations and insti-
tutions are transparent when they release information
about their internal practices, for example, their data
collection and data analysis. In the context of AI, an
example would be a shopping mall that announces at
the entrance and on its website whether it uses facial
recognition technology to track shoppers, rather than
keeping this information hidden (Rieger, 2018). The
second approach, however, looks at the tensions, strug-
gles, and discourses inherent in transparency projects,
and at unintended consequences and downsides
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of transparency. Following this approach, transparency
should be understood more holistically, including the
socio-material and ritualistic practices of organizations
when they ‘‘perform’’ transparency. The performativity
perspective understands transparency practices as
social and organizational phenomena whose meaning
goes substantially beyond the information conveyed.
Albu and Flyverbom (2019) illustrate the dual nature
of transparency with regard to the Snowden disclos-
ures. They highlight that while the disclosed informa-
tion on the secret US surveillance programs was the
focus of attention in public reception, disclosures
were taking place embedded in organizational con-
texts, involved curation by other professionals, and
were performed with certain strategic intentions,
making it more appropriate to consider them as
‘‘complex and dynamic communication processes
rather than simple and straightforward transmissions
of information’’ (p. 283). Similarly, technology compa-
nies such as Facebook or Google employ strong narra-
tives of openness, connectedness, and sharing on the
user side while being highly secretive themselves (Van
Dijck, 2013). For instance, a review of Google’s privacy
policy shows a combination of an abundance of highly
specific and detailed information on types of informa-
tion collected, partly presented in a very user-friendly
manner, alongside extremely vague general (and prac-
tically meaningless) statements about the purpose of
data usage, presented generically in terms of improve-
ment of user experience. In that case, transparency as
disclosure is evident in the detailed insight allowed into
some elements of their data collection practices, while
at the same time transparency also appears as occluding
performativity, where selective disclosure around data
use seems designed to occlude their potential scope and
problematic nature (Zuboff, 2019). Relevant research
also reflects this distinction between verifiability and
performativity: studies applying the transparency as
verifiability approach tend to find positive outcomes
for organizations, for example, positive effects on
organizational trust, while some studies within the
transparency as performativity approach reveal how
transparency can also undermine trust (Albu and
Flyverbom, 2019).
In a similar vein, Ananny and Crawford (2018) state
that transparency can intentionally occlude, for exam-
ple, when so much information is strategically disclosed
that it is impractical or impossible to sift through by a
layperson (needle in the haystack problem). An exam-
ple is the option that companies such as Google and
Facebook provide to download the personal informa-
tion collected about an individual user. While this
potentially enables users to see what is collected
about them, the data can be too large and not for-
matted in a way that they can access and understand
it (Curran, 2018). While the GDPR seemingly prevents
such practices, as the explanations in recital 58 imply,
the formulations still leave ample room for interpret-
ation. The needle in the haystack issue could become an
even bigger problem with cloud robotics and Internet
of things devices, where the data collected about a user
and its interactions are more complex and harder to
convey. Thus, it is crucial not only to consider the dis-
closed information but also the effort, skills, and
requirements needed to decode and interpret the infor-
mation (Kemper and Kolkman, 2018), or in other
words the information and privacy literacy demands
on the user side (Bartsch and Dienlin, 2016), including
the way in which disclosed information is embedded in
other practices that may support or hinder its use.
Finally, transparency may be practically inert due to
the embeddedness of the technology in a wider network
of devices. For large technology companies, such as
Google, Apple, or Amazon, which offer increasingly
interconnected suites of complex AI services across
life spheres, refusing consent to particular elements
may not be an option. Even if users disagree with par-
ticular elements, once a technology provider has been
chosen for the majority of their devices, these users are
locked-in. This is the case because refusal on the oper-
ation of one part of the system may significantly impair
the overall functionalities of the system. Moreover,
high switching costs, a lack of functional interoperable
alternatives, and the fact that AI systems are increas-
ingly becoming part of our daily infrastructure (West,
2019) mean that users are in a structurally disadvan-
taged position, with little agency to make demands
(Draper and Turow, 2019). Along these lines and
based on approaches from glitch studies, Kemper and
Kolkman (2018: 3) argue that ‘‘transparency of algo-
rithms can only be attained by virtue of an interested
critical audience.’’
Transparency as a relational concept
We have approached the topic of transparency in AI
from a dialectical perspective. Our goal was to provide
an integrated interdisciplinary discussion, where legal
considerations from the GDPR are contrasted with
considerations informed by the social sciences and
related to their respective ethical underpinnings. In
this final section, we intend to bring together the
insights from the information- and explanation-based
perspective outlined in Section ‘‘Transparency in Data
Protection Law’’ with the critical social science perspec-
tive outlined in Section ‘‘The limits of transparency for
AI’’ by outlining elements of a relational approach to
transparency.
We started by conducting an in-depth analysis of
transparency in data protection law, particularly
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within the GDPR. The discussion identified legal
requirements of transparency as well as the ethical
underpinnings of these transparency requirements in
the GDPR, showing critical relations between transpar-
ency, informed consent, and a specific underlying
understanding of individual autonomy and meaningful
human agency. According to this understanding, devel-
opers of the systems should inform the users about the
presence and underlying logic of AI-based decisions to
give the possibility of informed consent, with the
GDPR specifying how the information of the data con-
troller should be made transparent to the user.
We then highlighted the insensitivity of the GDPR
to the relevance of technological and social contexts in
which AI is embedded. We proposed a tailored and
multi-stakeholder approach to transparency for AI
that is supported by HCI and HRI research. The ana-
lysis of empirical studies on user perspectives showed
inconclusive evidence on the overall effects of transpar-
ency. We then discussed the embeddedness of AI and
associated transparency practices in wider organiza-
tional and cultural contexts. Following Albu and
Flyverbom (2019), we explored performativity as a
potentially fruitful way of conceptualizing the close
link between transparency effects and contextual fac-
tors. We think that this approach does justice to the
complexities and tensions that may arise when
transparency is enacted in practice (Ananny and
Crawford, 2018).
In the information-based approach, the user is con-
ceptualized as an independent actor, who makes
autonomous decisions on the basis of information
made available to them through transparency. By con-
trast, the performativity account sees contextual social
factors as considerably determining the meaning of
transparency practices. We propose to bring insights
from both perspectives together in a relational
approach to transparency that draws on the concept
of trustworthiness, where transparency is understood
with regard to its relational function, as a signal of
trustworthiness and willingness to be accountable to
those affected by one’s actions or products.
Trustworthiness and transparency are frequently
considered together (Mittelstadt et al., 2016). In
the organizational literature, trustworthiness has
been closely linked to transparency in recent years
(Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2012, Schnackenberg
and Tomlinson, 2016). However, it has been questioned
how closely transparency is linked to trust. As our
review of HCI research indicates, trust is not a simple
consequence of transparency. It has been argued by
Heald (2006) that transparency is only valuable instru-
mentally, as means to achieve a potential multitude of
other more fundamental values, including trust, and
that the value of transparency depends on the
achievement of these more fundamental values.
O’Neill (2002, 2003, 2009) argues that the value of
information provision should not be reduced to the
value of the informational content itself but that it
lies in the relational function of the communicative
action of the information provision; transparent infor-
mation provision can reassure the other party that they
are not being deceived or coerced. While the availability
of information is important for trust, the relational
context provides the wider frame within which the
information itself may be valued in different ways.
In the philosophical debate, trust has been analyzed
relationally as an attitude of optimism towards others,
assuming their goodwill, when we rely on them in the
face of uncertainty and risk of exploitation (Baier,
1986; Jones, 1996; Potter, 2002). Trust is inherently
cooperative and contextual, in that many things
that we value can only be realized through depending
on others and only under particular conditions.
However, responsible trust requires reflection on
others’ trustworthiness, assessing whether there is suf-
ficient evidence to assume that these agents are indeed
worthy of being trusted. Truthfulness, lack of exploit-
ation of vulnerabilities of the dependent party, the con-
structive contribution to expected benefits, and the
willingness by the trusted party to be held accountable
are the most salient criteria for trustworthiness that can
be derived from that literature. Depending on the
nature of engagement and communication between
the trusting and trusted parties, the specific vulnerabil-
ities and potential harms and benefits, what exactly it
takes to be deemed trustworthy may look quite differ-
ent between cases.
Potter (2002) suggests that understanding trust-
worthiness requires the use of a virtue ethical frame-
work by which the reliability of dispositions of those we
are relying on can be judged. Accordingly, trustworthi-
ness can be established based on stable and effective
patterns of behavior that indicate that the person or
organization that is being trusted deserves this trust.
The extensive consideration of wider patterns of behav-
ior, beyond the momentary provision of transparent
information on specific aspects of services, is essential
for such an assessment. This can take the shape of an
investigation of historical patterns in the actions taken
by organizations, as exemplified in Zuboff (2019). As
Zuboff argues, pervasive patterns of lies, manipulation,
breaches of commitments and the hidden exploitation
of users by big technology companies belie their official
public statements of good will and occasional gestures
of transparency.
The importance of truthfulness, supportiveness, sta-
bility of disposition, and accountability in ascribing
trustworthiness to a person, entity, or technical
system is also evident in the recent statement of the
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European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on
AI (HLEG AI, 2019), whose Ethics Guidelines for
Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence emphasize the
importance of trustworthy AI systems being (1)
lawful, (2) ethical, and (3) robust from a technical
and social perspective. More specifically, they highlight
‘‘seven key requirements for Trustworthy AI:
(1) human agency and oversight, (2) technical robust-
ness and safety, (3) privacy and data governance, (4)
transparency, (5) diversity, non-discrimination and fair-
ness, (6) environmental and societal well-being and
(7) accountability’’ (p. 4). Transparency is identified
as just one requirement among others, reinforcing the
above interpretation that trustworthiness is a result of
meeting a wider range of practical and normative
requirements.
Evidence of trustworthiness of complex interactive
information systems includes, for instance, technical
safety, operational reliability, and the coherence of
the system’s behavior with its stated purpose
(Hancock et al., 2011; Salem et al., 2015). Efforts by
organizations targeted at achieving transparency about
a product or service indicate to customers that they are
not afraid to provide the subject with detailed informa-
tion. The relational message that this sends to the sub-
ject is one of willingness to be accountable, a core
indicator of trustworthiness. The apparent willingness
of providers to be genuinely transparent towards their
users serves as a base for perceptions of trustworthiness
(Kizilcec, 2016). While achieving a full understanding
of information technologies is typically difficult due to
their complexity (Hayes and Shah, 2017), transparent
explanations of, for example, reasons for robot behav-
ior, can contribute to an increased perception of their
trustworthiness (Korpan et al., 2017; Ribeiro et al.,
2016). In contrast, where opacity is present, the risk
of remaining uninformed and potentially being
deceived or exploited remains salient for the user, and
continuing opacity, especially if clarifications have been
requested, might indicate a lack of concern for the
establishment of trustworthiness vis-a-vis the subject.
As Burrell (2016) states, opacity in information systems
can be either intentional, by keeping specific informa-
tion secret, or unintentional, for instance, due to the
lack of technical literacy; how such opacity is perceived
may be mediated by attitudes of trust. One complica-
tion with regard to complex information systems is that
some degree of opacity can be systemic and resistant to
attempts at transparency, especially when the use of
machine learning algorithms makes deductive explan-
ation impossible (Burrell, 2016; Van Opdorp et al.,
1991). This means that users need to be realistic in
their expectations of transparency and careful in judg-
ments with regard to what constitutes non-trustworthy,
culpable opacity.
However, in addition to what is required by service
users and service providers, users also need to be sup-
ported by systems of accountability (O’Neill, 2014).
The willingness of organizations to be accountable for
their services is often seen as relational underpinning of
the value of transparency; accountability was also
included as one core criterion in the HLEG AI
(2019). However, meaningful accountability requires
significantly more than mere transparency.
Accountability extends to managerial accountability
within organizations, but also requires the existence
of effective external systems of accountability. As
O’Neill (2014) highlights, achieving accountability
might rely ‘‘on democratic or corporate forms of gov-
ernance, or on legal, financial or professional forms of
accountability’’ (p. 177). Reliance on democratic and
legal forms of accountability which operate from out-
side of organizations themselves is particularly relevant
to achieve effective accountability of organizations
towards their service users, given their comparative
lack in power. The state’s effectiveness in ensuring its
citizens’ rights through means of regulation and legis-
lation, such as the GDPR, and associated enforcement
activities, grounds not just the state’s own trustworthi-
ness but will also determine whether citizens can
trust transparency expressions of service providers.
In order for the GDPR transparency requirement
to fulfill this trustworthiness function, greater clarity
will need to be developed regarding what constitutes
appropriate implementations of transparency. In
the absence of effective and clear regulation and
enforcement, the onus is on the service user to engage
critically with transparency expressions and ascertain
the trustworthiness of organizations, opening up
greater risks of misunderstanding and performative
manipulation.
Conclusion
To conclude, more multidisciplinary research is needed
to implement the legal transparency requirements into
technical systems. Studies in the area of algorithm
audits have provided essential insights into the tech-
nical workings of AI-powered, black-boxed systems,
showing problematic implications, for example, in
terms of bias (Chen et al., 2015; Sandvig et al., 2014;
Venkatadri et al., 2018). Another approach aiming
towards better transparency of machine-learning
algorithms is the What-If Tool, an open-source
TensorBoard web application that enables users to
analyze machine learning models. These models can
point out inference results and explore counterfactual
explanations without the need for coding (Wachter
et al., 2018). Such attempts show that multidisciplinary
collaborations between engineers, social scientists,
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lawyers, philosophers, and ethicists could lead to the
implementation of the transparency requirement from
the very design of concrete technology and bring about
the materialization of transparency-by-design.
Our reflections point to a need for more critical
research on AI, with a view to the relational under-
standing of transparency. Case studies and ethno-
graphic analyses could inform the lived realities of
transparency, for example, how companies use trans-
parency as a selling point and how users (fail to) engage
with transparency for self-reflection, self-enhancement,
or as a means of communication. Particular attention
should be paid to factors that make transparency mean-
ingful and trustworthy in the users’ eyes.
Policymakers should assess the usefulness and limi-
tations of the current transparency regime. They should
be aware of the performative aspects as well as the
dilemmas and constraints consumers of AI face (e.g.
Draper and Turow, 2019). In that regard, more meeting
spaces could be created, where policymakers are
exposed to the voices of user-centered and critical
researchers on transparency understandings and
demands.
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Notes
1. Unless otherwise stated, our definition of AI in this article
follows the definition by McCarthy et al. (2006: 11): ‘‘For
the present purpose the artificial intelligence problem is
taken to be that of making a machine behave in ways
that would be called intelligent if a human were so behav-
ing.’’ Current applications are chatbots, virtual assistants,
smart speakers, recommender systems, and deep learning
algorithms employed across a wide variety of Internet set-
tings such as search and social media.
2. Unless otherwise stated, our definition of transparency in
this article follows the definition by Lepri et al. (2018:
619): Transparency, which refers to the understandabil-
ity of a specific model, can be a mechanism that facilitates
accountability. More specifically, transparency can be
considered at the level of the entire model, at the level of
individual components (e.g. parameters), and at the level
of a particular training algorithm. In the strictest sense, a
model is transparent if a person can contemplate the entire
model at once.
3. We do not rely on a specific dialectical theory but use the
language of dialectics metaphorically and pragmatically as
a way to structure the article.
4. We could, for example, not find any reliable statistics
about the number of access requests made to major data
controllers (e.g. Facebook, Amazon, Alphabet) or how
many times individuals triggered Art. 22 GDPR in order
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